Alexander Zalivako

“Permanent” freeze of the Russian Central Bank’s assets

On 12 December 2025, the EU Council adopted Regulation 2025/2600 which sets out a separate sanctions’ regime for the assets of: (i) the Russian Central Bank (the “CBR“); and (ii) any entity acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, the CBR. The Russian National Wealth Fund is specifically identified by name in the regulation as an entity falling in category (ii). The relevant press release is available at the following link.

The core of the Regulation is to prohibit any transfer of the assets of the CBR/its affiliates (Article 2). It is notable that this measure does not affect the assets of the Russian Ministry of Finance (or, indeed, any other Russian public entity).

Both the Regulation and the press release emphasise that the freeze is temporary and reversible (see, e.g., recitals 12, 24, 28 and Article 6 of the Regulation).

Nevertheless, Article 6 of the Regulation sets out the following three conditions which shall be satisfied to lift the freeze:

(a) Russia ceases its war of aggression against Ukraine;
(b) Russia provides reparations to Ukraine to the extent necessary to allow for reconstruction without adverse economic or financial consequences for the Union; and

(c) Russia’s actions in the context of its war of aggression against Ukraine have objectively ceased to pose a serious risk of
severe difficulties to the economy of the Union and its Member States.

It is clear from the above conditions that they are highly unlikely to be satisfied and, accordingly, for all practical purposes the freeze of the CBR’s assets is nothing but permanent.

The sole purpose for repeatedly emphasising the temporary nature of the freeze, then, seems to be an attempt to minimise the risks of an annulment proceedings which the CBR may consider issuing against the Regulation as well as any investment arbitration claim. The main argument in any such proceedings is likely to be that such measures are unlawful because they amount to an expropriation of assets without compensation.

The relevant venue for the proceedings to annul the Regulation is the General Court and the legal basis is Article 263 of the TFEU (see our video on the annulment procedure and an overview video on judicial and administrative review of the EU sanctions).

It is, however, unlikely that the CBR will issue proceedings in the General Court, because, in essence, this new measure adds little to an existing freeze affecting the CBR’s assets under Article 5a, paragraph (4) of Regulation 833/2014 and applicable since 2022. The only practical difference of the new freeze is that it does not require periodic renewal and, accordingly, cannot be vetoed by one or several Member States. As the CBR has never attempted to annul Article 5a restrictions, it is unlikely that they will attempt to issue such proceedings now.

It remains to be seen, however, whether the CBR files a claim for an investment arbitration against Belgium (where Euroclear, an International Central Securities Depositary, where the major part of the CBR’s assets is blocked is located) under 1989 Bilateral Investment Treaty between the Soviet Union (to which Russia succeeded), Belgium and Luxembourg. This venue has already been explored by Russian private investors. Assuming that the CBR is able to prove its status as an “investor”, this venues will be more promising given overal investor-friendly position of such tribunals.

The CBR already announced issuing proceedings against Euroclear in Russian national courts (see the press release of the CBR). This is more of a political act, because Euroclear is unlikely to have any meaningful assets either in Russia or any jurisdiction where a judgement of a Russian court is enforceable.

Whilst the freeze by itself may seem as adding little to already existing restrictions which affect the CBR assets in the EU, it actually represents a very important development if viewed in the context of the on-going discussions as to proposed future use of the CBR assets to provide financial support to Ukraine (see the current proposal for such support measures).

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