On 5 February 2026, the ECJ issued a judgement in a preliminary ruling procedure (Case C-619/24) where, in essence, the highest EU Court endorsed the current practice of several Member States which chose quite an unexpected strategy to apply the EU sanctions, namely to apply Article 3i(1) of Regulation 833/2014 in a way to restrict the transfer from Russia into the EU of private movable property even in the circumstances when such movable property is not intended for sale, but for personal use.
We discussed this issue in our video dedicated to this matter and this case is a chilly reminder of its relevance.
The case related to a Russian citizen who is lawfully residing in Germany and wanted to bring home a personal vehicle which he purchased in second-hand market in Russia. The German customs authority ceased such a vehicle on the basis that its import into Germany constituted a breach of Article 3i(1) of Regulation 833/2014.
Article 3i(1) sets out the following prohibition:
“1. It shall be prohibited to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, goods which generate significant revenues for Russia thereby enabling its actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, as listed in Annex XXI into the Union if they originate in Russia or are exported from Russia.”
Annex XXI includes various types of items, including vehicles.
One would hardly expect that the above provision should restrict the transfer of a second-hand car from Russia to Germany by a person who is lawfully residing there and intends to use it for his(her) own private purposes.
Yet it is exactly this interpretation of Article 3i(1) which was taken by law-enforcement authorities in certain EU Member States and is now endorsed by the ECJ. Notably in interpreting this provision the ECJ did not make any distinction as to: (i) the date when the car was purchased; and (ii) whether it will be subsequently retransferred back to Russia. The ECJ also took no account that whilst an EU citizen (or his(her) family member) can, at least, apply for an authorisation for such a transfer, no such option is available for a lawful resident in the EU with a nationality of the third state, which constitutes a clear discrimination on nationality basis.
This judgement creates a clear risk of arrest of personal vehicles even for the residents of Russian regions situated within the EU and/or neighbouring the EU (e.g., Kaliningrad region) who may wish to travel to the EU for any personal or business needs by their personal cars with the view to go back to their habitual place of residence outside the EU. Even such a temporary entry by a personal vehicle into the EU may be qualified as its “transfer” into the EU which is prohibited under Article 3i(1).
Same issues arise with other personal items which will not be qualified as personal effects, e.g., musical instruments or some complex equipment.
This case is a reminder that the EU sanctions can interfere even in day-to-day matters of ordinary people many of whom may be long-time EU residents.
It is also a reminder of the current approach taken by the EU Courts when interpreting sanctions – no consideration was given by the ECJ to an argument that the arrest of the vehicle did not diminish the revenues of Russia (something which Article 3i(1) sets out as its purpose). The Court did not consider the clearly discriminatory nature of the restriction (which, although was not raised in a request for a preliminary ruling, the Court should have addressed by itself as touching upon a fundamental pillar of the rule of law). Conversely, the Courts are willing to take the most conservative view of the relevant provisions.