On 9 October 2026, the US OFAC issued a succinct and yet an important general license No. 135. The general license permits all transactions related to the sale of Russian origin diesel fuel to the US. The license is effective until 7 April 2027. There is no limitation on the volume of the Russian diesel which can be exported.
Often described as an unprecedented deal between the US and Russia, this general license follows the trend of previously granted US exemptions for the sale of Russian crude and petroleum products which we discussed in our earlier posts. It is for the first time, however, that such an exemption is granted for a half-year period, going far beyond mid-term elections to US Congress.
From an economic perspective, given the reduction of the Russian refining capacities and on-going attacks against tankers, the issue of the licence is unlikely to allow Russia to substantially increase its exports of diesel and related revenues.
Nevertheless, the license is, certainly, very important from the political perspective, because (together with previously issued licenses) it is yet another evidence of shift in the US sanctions policy against Russia. The issue of the license also demonstrates (yet another time) an unwillingness of the current US President to co-ordinate its sanctions’ policy with the EU partners. This absence of any coordination is even more symbolic, given that the EU is a net importer of diesel, whereas the US is its net exporter.
From a more technical, legal perspective, the following elements of the license are noteworthy.
First, unlike licenses from spring 2026 (general licenses 134 -A – B – C), the exemption relates to diesel fuel only. Previously exemptions applied to the crude and all petroleum products of Russian origin.
Second, the general license No. 135 grants a broad exemption from two US sanctions programmes against Russia. Accordingly, a better view of the license would be that it grants an exemption not only from the specific restriction related to the prohibition of exports of Russian petroleum products to the US, but also (1) dealing with Russian companies which are designated SDNs under such programmes (which would be most of Russian oil majors); and (2) paying to the accounts of Russian sanctioned banks.
However, the license does not grant any exemptions from other US sanctions’ programmes (which was the case, for example, in general license 134C).
Finally, there is an interesting question of the lawfulness of this sanctions’ relief against the background of the recently issued Lindsey Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act which we discussed in our video. In essence, the question is to which extent the text of the Act limits the powers of the President to modify existing sanctions against Russia and/or mandates the President to impose new sanctions. The issuance of the license (without any involvement of Congress) gives the answer to this question at least the one taken by the Administration – the President did not view his foreign policy powers to be restricted by the Act.